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Inter-level relations in computer science,
biology, and psychology*
FRED BOOGERD, FRANK BRUGGEMAN, CATHOLIJN JONKER,
HUIB LOOREN DE JONG, ALLARD TAMMINGA, JAN TREUR,
HANS WESTERHOFF & WOUTER WIJNGAARDS
ABSTRACT Investigations into inter-level relations in computer science, biology and psychology
call for an empirical turn in the philosophy of mind. Rather than concentrate on a priori discussions
of inter-level relations between “completed” sciences, a case is made for the actual study of the
way inter-level relations grow out of the developing sciences. Thus, philosophical inquiries will
be made more relevant to the sciences, and, more importantly, philosophical accounts of
inter-level relations will be testable by confronting them with what really happens in science.
Hence, close observation of the ever-changing reduction relations in the developing sciences, and
revision of philosophical positions based on these empirical observations, may, in the long run, be
more conducive to an adequate understanding of inter-level relations than a traditional a priori
approach.
1. Introduction
What is the gist of the arguments put forward in the previous three articles? Before
we are in a position to draw some general conclusions from our discussions of
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inter-level reductions in the sciences, we want to brie y set the stage. It is true that
most of the philosophers of science or of mind cited in our discussions have
put forward their arguments and propounded their concepts with an eye to an
ideal,  nished science. For instance, Nagel’s (1961) classical ideas on theory
reduction can only be applied in the (rare) cases where both the higher-level theory
and the lower-level theory are more or less completed, that is, formalized
and axiomatized. Hence, for Nagel, theory reduction consists in deducing all
sentences of the higher-level theory from the axioms and theorems of the lower-level
theory. Obviously, this goal necessitates de nitions of all higher-level concepts in
terms of lower-level concepts. Thus, Nagel’s ideas on reduction are a direct
consequence of the traditional ideal of knowledge that usually is associated
with Cartesianism, but which, as Beth (1959) has shown, could also be aptly called
the Aristotelian ideal of knowledge. A key characteristic of these traditional ways
of thinking about science is that they are a priori and static. Toulmin (1990) contrasts
this traditional, rationalistic ideal of knowledge with the sceptical, empirical,
fragmentary and historical view of knowledge as defended by, among others,
Montaigne.
In the 1960s, due to his explorations in the history of science, Kuhn felt
increasingly uncomfortable with the prevailing foundationalist attitude in the philos-
ophy of science. His The structure of scienti c revolutions (1962) reconstructs the
philosophy of science, paying close attention to the historical development of
science. For our present purposes, it is suf cient to note that Kuhn gave a new
impetus to a dynamic philosophy of science: instead of concentrating on a priori
conditions of ideal static knowledge, Kuhn furthers the systematic and empirical
study of changes in scienti c theories. Nevertheless, philosophical investigations
aimed at specifying and defending a priori theories for ideal and static phenomena
still dominate the agenda for much contemporary philosophy, ranging from ethics to
the philosophy of mind.
Recent discussions in the philosophy of mind on reductionism and elimina-
tivism try to  nd convincing arguments concerning the place and the status of the
mental in a  nished, purely physicalistic theory of the mind. In this way, these
philosophers tried to develop a blueprint of, among other things, how inter-level
reductions in the sciences should ideally be conducted, if such a reduction is
possible in the  rst place. Such philosophical arguments do have some immediate
practical signi cance: they provide some philosophical justi cation for preferring
one research strategy in cognitive science to the detriment of another. Nevertheless,
they can never provide decisive arguments for such a choice. It should be clear from
our articles that we did not take arms against philosophical deliberations aimed at
some inde nite point in the future. We do want, however, to assess the merits of
these philosophical theories and concepts in describing scienti c practice in real
laboratory life (including the computer lab). We will try to assess the diagnostic
value of concepts that are common currency in the philosophy of mind and science,
such as “supervenience,” “emergence,” and “multiple realization,” in illuminating
real empirical work.
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2. Inter-level reductions in computer science
Prima facie, the situation in computer science seems most in line with Nagel’s classic
ideas concerning theory reduction. In computer science a higher-level description
language has an autonomous semantics, which enables users to interpret the higher-
level language without prior knowledge of the semantics of lower-level languages. If
desired, a process description in a higher-level language can be automated by
translating this higher-level language (usually via a number of intermediate steps, via
assemblers or compilers) into a lower-level language that directly relates to physical
processes within a computer. Thus, “bridge laws” connecting higher-level and
lower-level descriptions can be established. The required reduction relations that are
formulated as a basis for these translations need to comply with the autonomous
semantics of the higher-level description language that is translated and the seman-
tics of the lower-level language into which it is translated. This constraint enables us
to check whether a proposed formulation of a reduction relation is correct: a
reduction relation is (to be) a meaning-preserving relation between expressions of a
higher-level language L2 and expressions of a lower-level language L1. Veri cation of
a reduction relation can be twofold. First, via empirical veri cation it can be checked
whether the proposed reduction relation preserves the informal semantics of the
reduced and the reducing language, which both have an informal autonomous
semantics due to the fact that they were introduced to describe real-world processes.
Second, via computer-aided veri cation it can be checked automatically whether the
reduction relation preserves the formal semantics of the languages under consider-
ation, as description languages usually are formalized languages.
Jonker et al. (2002) noticed that different translations of a higher-level language
description f may give rise to different lower-level language descriptions y and c, all
describing the same process in the real world. Hence, higher-level language descrip-
tions are multiple realizable on lower-level language descriptions. The notion of
“multiple realizability” is only a characteristic of a domain, to be used for analysis;
the aim of using this concept is not to identify or synthesize the relationships
between higher-level and lower-level description languages. In contrast, use of the
notion of “supervenience” aims at expressing something more substantial about the
relationships. However, this very abstract concept leaves us in the dark about the
exact relations between higher-level and lower-level languages as well. Therefore,
these conceptual instruments that have been developed in the philosophy of mind to
analyse inter-level relations lack the required precision: they are axes rather than
lancets. The notion of “context-speci c reduction relation” is more speci c. Though
in some cases it may be unclear whether the notion can be applied, in cases where
it is applicable, the notion provides a means to formulate precise relationships
between higher-level expressions and lower-level expressions. Indeed, this concep-
tual instrument seems to provide an adequate means to describe and classify the
variety of modelling and programming environments and platforms in computer
science.
The paper by Jonker et al. (2002) subsequently focused, with an eye to some
hotly debated issues in contemporary philosophy of mind, on interpretation and use
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of reduction relations in computer science: given reduction relations between a
higher-level and a lower-level language, what are we going to do with them? Should
we stop speaking of the objects of the reduced higher-level description language and
applaud the “ontological simpli cation” the reductions provide us with? First, the
authors note that it might well be that for human users, only the descriptions in
higher-level languages are practicable, as descriptions in lower-level languages are
too complex to be understood by humans. Dennett’s (1987) tenets about the
intentional stance’s tractability advantages coincide quite neatly with the  ndings of
Jonker et al. More importantly, inter-level reductions actually reinforce our belief in
the reliability of the higher-level description languages.
We would, however, be too rash, if we extrapolated the paper’s  ndings about
inter-level reduction in computer science to issues in the philosophy of mind tout
court, since the exact analogy between description languages in computer science
and psychological explanations of behaviour is yet to be investigated more thor-
oughly. Jonker et al. showed that proposals for suitable formulations of reduction
relations are evaluated on the basis of empirical criteria related to the semantics of
the languages. Nevertheless, this feature of inter-level relations in computer science
by itself is not a satisfactory answer to the following question: are higher-level
languages describing processes in the physical or in the societal world of the same
kind of abstract objects as psychological theories aiming to explain cognitive pro-
cesses and behavioural patterns? Within computer science, the initial motivation for
the construction of the higher-level description language was the need for a strictly
regimented language to describe processes in real life, since such a regimented
language would, if implemented, enable automation of these processes. Hence,
higher-level description languages do describe patterns of phenomena in the real
world, with which the dynamic patterns generated by implemented description
languages (ought to) match.
Many authors writing on the philosophy of mind, such as Churchland (1984,
pp. 71–72), prefer to interpret “folk psychology” as a (proto)scienti c theory aiming
to explain behaviour. Some authors, like Dennett (1991) and Jackson and Pettit
(1990), have exploited concepts from computer science to discuss these matters. For
example, Jackson and Pettit (1990) used the computer science notion of a
“program” to develop an account of explanation tailored to the needs of biology,
cognitive science and the social sciences. So, despite apparent dissimilarities be-
tween description languages in computer science and psychological explanations of
behaviour, it might be the case that the similarities justify the extrapolation of the
present philosophical  ndings about computer science to the philosophy of mind.
Further research to clarify the matter in more detail would be helpful. One of the
issues addressed in such further research might be the notion of intentionality: we
may ask whether higher-level description languages contain intentional concepts. Do
they represent something? Are they “about” states of affairs? If so, the situation in
computer science would be even more relevant to the debate on reductionism in the
philosophy of mind, since we would have a case on hand of a reduction of a language
containing intentional concepts to a purely extensional language describing physical
processes. Of course, it will just beg the question to assert that higher-level descrip-
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tion languages in computer science lack intentional concepts, on the basis of the
following a priori argument:
(1) In computer science, higher-level languages can be reduced to nonintentional
lower-level languages;
(2) philosophers have shown that a reduction of intentional higher-level lan-
guages to nonintentional lower-level languages is impossible.
Therefore,
(3) philosophers have shown that higher-level languages in computer science are
not intentional.
Hence, a detailed philosophical investigation of criteria for intentionality and the
aforementioned autonomous semantics of higher-level languages must be conducted
to throw more light on this matter of central importance in philosophical psy-
chology.
3. Integrating lower-level theories in cell biology
The central goal in cell biology is to gain a complete understanding of what is going
on in a living cell. Unlike the debates on reductionism in computer science and in
biological psychology, in biology the reductionist problem is not the familiar one of
 nding inter-level relations between pre-existent higher-level theories and pre-exis-
tent lower-level theories, but rather the problem of integrating lower-level theories,
data and theories from genetics, biochemistry, physiology, biophysics, and structural
biology into higher-level theories of the living cell. A single cell-biological theory
integrating all lower-level theories would be the ultimate goal. How should this be
done?
Biological reductionism gives the following answer. In explaining biological
phenomena at some initial level L (e.g. a living cell),  rst, an inventory of the several
classes A1, A2, … An of phenomena at L (e.g. metabolism, replication, transcription,
translation, and transport) must be made. Each class Ai constitutes a level Li of
biological phenomena, and each level Li is an immediate sublevel of the initial level
L. Now, following the reductionist methodology, each level Li of phenomena is
investigated in isolation from all the phenomena at other immediate sublevels of L.
Ideally, such an investigation results in a subtheory Ti for biological phenomena at
sublevel Li. Thus we may  nd adequate subtheories T1, T2, … Tn for all immediate
sublevels Li of L. Hence, or so the reductionist story goes, if we combine these
subtheories T1, T2 … Tn into a single theory, we end up with a satisfactory theory T
explaining the biological phenomena at our initial level L.
The real problem has, of course, been hidden in this sunny picture of the
reductionist strategy. Each subtheory Ti explains phenomena at sublevel Li in
isolation from all the phenomena of other immediate sublevels of L, that is, under certain
conditions Ci. Hence, in vitro research into a sublevel Li can only justify the
statement: “If conditions Ci apply, then phenomena of class Ai are explained
adequately by theory Ti.” Obviously, conditions C1, C2, … Cn do not all apply at level
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L. Since in uences and interactions with classes of phenomena of other immediate
sublevels were ignored during the construction of a subtheory Ti about phenomena
of class Ai, subtheory Ti does not necessarily explain phenomena of class Ai in case
some of the other classes of phenomena are present. It remains an open question to
what extent these in uences and interactions thwart the application of subtheory Ti
at level L. Hence, the “combination” of subtheories T1, T2, … Tn into a theory T
explaining the phenomena at level L is a major obstacle of the reductionist strategy,
an obstacle that is considered to be insurmountable in principle by antireductionists.
Antireductionism claims that the phenomena at level L always have properties that
do not hold for any class of phenomena at sublevels of L. Properties having this
remarkable characteristic are called emergent properties, of which Bruggeman et al.
(2002) present some examples in Section 7 of their paper.
After these rather dim  ndings about the reductionist strategy, we may ask: are
the subtheories T1, T2, … Tn of any use in the construction of the overall theory T?
Avoiding an extreme antireductionist stance, Bruggeman et al. opt for a moderate
position: subtheories T1, T2, … Tn may be useful for the construction of T. Exper-
imental testing, in vitro or, when a computational model of several in vitro theories
is investigated, in silico, to assess the effects of (gradually) relaxing the conditions Ci
under which a subtheory Ti holds, should convince researchers of the applicability of
Ti at the initial level L.
Nevertheless, the authors expect that an overall theory of a biochemical system
of phenomena at level L usually cannot generally be conceived of as a (linear or
nonlinear) mathematical function of the theories T1, T2, … Tn of its immediate
sublevels. Two emergent properties in particular—“macromolecular crowding” and
“channeling”—speak against these reductionist methods and plead for a holistic
approach instead: indeed, there are in vivo phenomena which cannot be studied in
vitro or in silico. Ideally, such biocomplex phenomena should be measured and
manipulated within the living cell. Hence, an a priori reductionist stance is not a
viable position. On the other hand, experimental results have clearly indicated that
the reductionist strategy in some cases can be fruitful. Bruggeman et al.’s example on
yeast glycolysis indicates that, at least for this metabolic pathway, its functioning can
be understood in terms of the (in vitro determined) properties and interactions of its
constituent enzymes. Therefore, an outright antireductionist stance on methodolog-
ical issues in cell biology will not do as well.
Favoring, on the basis of a priori considerations, one method of inquiry to the
detriment of the other leads to a biased methodology that shields off unwelcome
empirical evidence. Thus, Bruggeman et al. make a case for a pluralistic strategy,
combining reductionist and antireductionist strategies, thereby making the best of
the available evidence. A pluralist approach leaves all options with respect to the
organization of classes of phenomena within biosystems open, so that empirical
considerations, unlike in exclusively reductionist or in exclusively antireductionist
approaches, have a  nal say in choosing the appropriate methodology. It can very
well be that, ultimately, we need both reductionist and antireductionist strategies,
depending on the classes of phenomena that are being investigated. Cell biologists
try to understand the functioning of living cells in terms of their component parts
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and the interactions among these parts. Understanding should entail mechanistic
explanation and functional interdependency. The objective of cell biology cannot be
reached if it is not accepted that living systems are complex nonlinear systems, some
aspects of which can only be understood by considering the system as a whole.
4. Inter-level relations in psychology: a dynamical perspective
In his contribution, Looren de Jong (2002) notices that the concepts and arguments
that were developed in the current debate on reductionism, no matter whether they
come from functionalists, eliminativists or “new wave reductionists,” fail to accu-
rately describe the actual developments of sciences such as biology and biological
psychology.
For centuries, Euclidean geometry and Archimedean statics have prevailed as
showpieces of this Aristotelian ideal of knowledge. (In this connection we also have
to mention Spinoza’s Ethica and Newton’s Principia.) Modern philosophy of science
has, of course, departed from the ideal that scienti c theories are based on self-evi-
dent principles, but its view of a scienti c theory as a deductively closed set of true
sentences is still going strong. Though 20th-century philosophy of science, which
has been dominated largely by logical positivism, has signi cantly altered our
conception of knowledge and science, in large areas of philosophy traditional
concepts, such as the idea that scienti c “laws” are timeless, context-independent
and necessary, still dominate the debates. Moreover, though it is granted that our
biological and psychological knowledge is still far from mature, a central topic in the
contemporary debate on reductionism is still the question: “If physiology has
reached a mature state, what will be the status of our body of folk psychological
truths?” Understandably, the discussion has focused on the possibility or impossibil-
ity of de ning higher-level concepts in terms of lower-level concepts. Let us call the
reductionism discussion that investigates the particularities of inter-level reductions
of completed higher-level theories to completed lower-level theories “static reduc-
tionism.” It is static, since changes of the theories under consideration are left out of
consideration.
On the other hand, we might also look at inter-level relations between incom-
plete higher-level and incomplete lower-level theories. Only recently, this dynamic
branch has come to the fore in the philosophy of mind. The recent study of Bickle
(1998) is a case in point (in the philosophy of biology, such a dynamic approach was
defended by Shaffner, 1993). Nevertheless, this change of orientation has not been
radical enough, according to Looren de Jong. In his contribution, he argues that,
although Bickle does consider theory change, Bickle’s New Wave Reductionism put
insuf cient emphasis on the role of co-evolution of higher-level and lower-level
theories that both are in the process of being completed.
In the philosophical literature on biology and cognitive neuroscience, Looren de
Jong discerns a new perspective for understanding inter-level relations between
developing theories. Obviously, these inter-level relations inherit the tentative
character from the theories they connect. Hence, just like the statements in the
theories under consideration, the inter-level relations have the status of hypotheses,
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which may have to be revised if the theories they connect are revised. The function
of inter-level relations, therefore, is a heuristic one, in that, during their develop-
ments, both the higher-level and the lower-level theory can mutually in uence each
other by way of the heuristic inter-level relations.
Unlike the universal laws of physics, theories are usually constructed for only a
restricted domain of phenomena. These restrictions may depend on the circum-
stances in which these phenomena take place, on the level of abstraction of these
phenomena, and on the interests of the researchers. Hence, in, for example, biology,
we  nd a patchwork of theories, each with different explanatory interests and a more
or less limited scope. General laws covering all biological phenomena are not to be
expected, perhaps not even in “completed” biology. Combining these characteristics
leads to a view of explanation that allows for several explanations of classes of
phenomena at different levels of abstraction: a pluralistic, domain-speci c, multi-
level account of explanation.
Interaction between two or more theories covering overlapping classes of
phenomena takes place by way of tentative heuristic inter-level relations between
concepts of the respective theories. These inter-level relations may, on the one hand,
enable us to interpret micro-level phenomena in terms of concepts of the higher-
level theory, and, on the other hand, make possible more precise formulations and
quanti cations of qualitative higher-level theories in terms of phenomena described
by lower-level theories. Thus, development and revision of both higher-level and
lower-level theories are furthered by heuristic inter-level relations, which may have
to be revised in the whole process. In this way, inter-level relations may be used to
extend the scope of some lower-level theory by tying it up to higher-level theories.
Hence, heuristic inter-level relations lead to extensions of existing theories rather
than reductions.
5. Conclusion
The debate on reductionism in 20th-century philosophy of mind has focused largely
on the form inter-level relations between a higher-level theory and a lower-level
theory should  nally and ideally take. Hence, the history of the recent philosophy of
mind comprises a variety of proposals for such a form and counter-examples to such
proposals, oscillating from Nagel’s “bridge laws” to Putnam’s rebuttal of the identity
theory, from arguments for type-materialism or token-materialism of various brands
and Baker’s (1987) thought experiments to counter such arguments. Kim’s recent
proposals for functionalization  t within the same picture as well. It is to be noticed
that much of this type of philosophical research is a priori: currently, no single
science provides the ideal inter-level relations these philosophers argue about. The
fact that these philosophers draw on material from the empirical sciences to support
their proposals or counter-examples and the fact that, of course, in an actual
reduction the form has to be given  esh by way of empirical data do not entail that
the philosophical project itself has been an empirical, naturalistic undertaking.
Instead of investigating varieties of reduction as they actually occur in the sciences,
however provisional and de cient they may be, by and large the reductionist debate
INTER-LEVEL RELATIONS 471
in the philosophy of mind has been restricted to the normative issue of providing a
coherent sketch of the form of ideal inter-level relations.
The inquiries into computer science, cell biology and biological psychology
showed in the  rst place that the nature of inter-level relations has to be assessed
empirically with an eye to the dynamics of empirical research. Close observation of
the ever-changing reduction relations in the developing sciences, and revision of
philosophical positions based on these empirical observations, may, in the long run,
be more conducive to an adequate understanding of inter-level relations than a
traditional a priori approach. In computer science, it is obvious that not every
proposal for a translation between higher-level language L2 and lower-level language
L1 will do, since the higher-level language has an autonomous semantics that must
be retained in a meaning-preserving translation. In cell biology, we may not expect
a priori that either an exclusive antireductionist or an exclusive reductionist method-
ology will automatically lead to a correct theory. Empirical considerations have to
decide between the several alternative types of possible relations between the
higher-level theory and the lower-level theories. In biological psychology, inter-level
relations must be seen as hypotheses stating relations between concepts of higher-
level and lower-level theories, hypotheses that steer and focus research at both levels.
Of course, these hypotheses may have to be revised as research develops.
Summarizing, the three articles above make a plea for broadening the scope of
the reductionism debate. By actually studying the way inter-level relations grow out
of the developing sciences, we will not only make philosophical inquiries more
relevant to the sciences, but we will be able to test our philosophical accounts of
inter-level relations by confronting them with what really happens in science. Hence,
we may construct better instruments for analysing inter-level relations and we will
probably gain a better understanding of science itself.
Notes
*The authors appear in alphabetical order.
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